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Summary findings
Unusually rich administrative  data sets covering both  *  Women are  nO more likely to be displaced than
firms and workers  enabled  Orazem,  Vodopivec,  and  Wu  mcii, and  face smallcr  postdisplacement  wage losses.
to study displacement  in Slovenia during  1987-93.  Non-Slovenians  arc nio  more likely to he displaced than
'I'hey describe  displacement  trends  and the  Slovenians, and  face equal wage losses.
characteristics  of displaced workers,  comparing  them  to  *  Firm characteristics  matter.  The smaller and  less
those  in North  America during  a major recession. They  profitabic  the firm, the grcater  the likelihood of botih
analyze the  determinants  of displacement  in the  displacemeint and  job-switching. Restructuring  subsidies
framework  of labor turnover,  and  explore factors  that lower firm layoff costs incrcase the number  of firm-
associated  with postdisplacement  wage losses. Among  and worker-initiated  transitions.
their  findings:  * About half the displaced workers  who find a'ew  jobs
- A comparison  of displacement  in Slovenia in  change occupations  and about  a third change industry.
1990-93  and in North  America during  the  recession of  "  Only about  a third of workers  displaced in 1990 had
the early 1980s shows striking similarities  in the  found a job by the end of 1991.  Surprisingly,  for more
incidence  of displacement  by gender  and  industry,  as  than  6S percent  of them, wage growth  exceeded  the
well as in reemployment  paths.  median wage growth  in the economy (17 percent).
- Workers  try to avoid displacement  both by  Those not  reemployed  seem -o be paying a hcavy toll:
switching  to another  job and by leaving the labor force.  Not only do they stay unemployed  much  longer, but they
Before becoming  displaced,  they also take wage cuts.  face n.uch lower  reemployment  wages.
- Both the probability  of displacement  and  the  *  As studies of displacement  in the United States also
probability of  job quits are  negatively correlated  with  show, greater job experience  is associated with  heavier
t;nure.  postdisplacement  wage losses. The magnitude  of those
losses is consistent  with findings about U.S. wage losses.
This paper - a product of the Transition Fconomics Division, Policy  Rescarch Department - is part of a largcr effort in the
department to investigatc how labor markets work during the transition. T-he  study was funded  by the Bank's Research Support
Budget  under the rescarch project "Labor Market Dynamics  during the Transition of a Socialist Economy" (RPO 677-20). Copies
of this paper are available free from the  World Bank, 1818 H Strcet NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Jennifer
Prochnow-Walker, room NI 1-023, cxtension 37466 (37 pages). April 1995.
Thc  Policy  Pscarce  Working  PtPir  Screcs  disseminates  iCe  findings  Of  work  in progress  to  encourage  fhe exchange  of zdeas  abouf
deLvelopmcnt  issYcs.  An  objecstivof  thceseres  isfo get  txcefindings  out  guickly,  e"wn  if the  presenttations  are  less  than  fully  polisbed.  7*e
papers  carry  the  names  of  the  autbors  and  sbould  be  used and  cited  accordingly.  T'bc  findings,  interpretations.  and  conclusions  are  the
authors'  oum  and  should  not be  attributed  to the  World  Bank.  its ExecutYive  Board  of Dire.ctors,  or  any of  its n7cmbe  countries.
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manuscript.After years of stable employment, workers in transition economies have been confronted witki
job loss on a massive scale.  While displacement  can be justified as part of the "creative destruction"
that in necessary  to allocate scarce resources efficiently, it imposes a heavy toll on individuals hurt by
displacement.  Experience in market economies shows that the costs of displacement  take two forms.
First, job losses generate unemployment  and thus waste of resources.  Second, upon reemployment,
displaced workers experience earnings losses, both in the short- and the long-run, due to the
destruction of firm specific human capital entailed by the job loss.
This paper illustrates the process of displacement in transition economies, utilizing an
unusually rich data set on Slovenian workers.  The paper examines factors which affect firm layoffs
and quits, wage setting in the face of potential layoffs, and the effect of displacement on wages for
workers who are successful in finding new jobs.  Among our findings are that more skilled workers
are less likely to be displaced but are more likely to quit, and some workers appear to quit to avoid
higher probability of layoff.  We also find that prior to displacement, workers take a cut in their
wages.  Reemployment  probabilities are influenced by both labor demand- and labor supply-side
factors, and reemployed displaced workers receive real wage gains as a result of displacement.  The
last surprising result is shown to be driven by nonrandom selection of reemployed  workers from the
pool of displaced workers.
The paper opens with a brief review of the institutional environment  leading to transition and
the changes  which have affected displacement. Following a brief overview of the stylized facts of
displacenent, the paper develops a simple model of turnover. The model's implications are tested
using data from administrative records of the registered unemployed, the Slovenia Pension and Invalid
Fund, work history data, and accounting  information on firms.1.  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
From the early 1950s  until the 1988/89 reforms, Yugoslavia  maintained a unique social and  economic
system known as worker self-management.'  On paper, the system gave workers a mandate to
participate in many aspects of firm decisionmaking. In practice, worker participation  was limited
largely to determining relative pay within the firm.  As in other socialist economies, the government
interfered directly in many aspects of firm decisionmaking. Directly affecting the incidence of
displacement were government interventions  to preserve jobs, limit wage iinequality  and limit firm
failures.
Job security in Yugoslavia was constitutionally  guaranteed.  Article 13 of the constitution  of
1974 stipulated  that "The work-er  of associated labor ...  has a non-alienable right to work."  If
technological innovations  produced labor redundancies, Articlt-  32 stipulated that the worker had to be
placed ima another assignment that fitted his/her abilities and skills.  Except for extremely rare cases
of bankruptcy. workers could be fired only for breaching work discipline or refusing job
reassignment.
To limit wage variation across firms, firm wage bills were set centrally so as to limit
differences ini  wage bills across firms of comparable size and occupational structure.  Once the wage
bill was set, a referendum of workers was used to set pay wit};n the firm.  The outcomes of the
referenda tended to limit wage differentials by skill.  The formulaic setting of wage bills explicitly
limited wage gains in successful firms and limited wage reductions in unsuccessful firms.  As a
consequence, mandated wage bills were very low relative to earnings in the most successful
enterprises, but exceeded earnings in the least successful enterprises.  To prevent bankruptcies - and
to maintain job and wage security -- the Yugoslav government created numerous channels by which
1 Until achieving  independence  in October 1981, Slovenia  was one of the six constituent  units of
Yugoslavia.
2income was shifted from profitable to unprofitable enterprises.  Formal taxes were supplemented  by
an informal  system  of quasitaxes  and  losses on  money.2 Profitable firms were  subjected  to informal
taxes and inflation taxes on money holdings while unprofitable  firms received informal subsidics and
money gains ("returns'  from borrowing in an inflationary economy). These subsidies enabled the
unsuccessful firms to meet their mandated payrolls.
Vodopivec (1994) quantified the different types of income transfers before transition.  He
found that the informal components of tranisfers  were both larger and more variable than their formal
counterparts.  While formal taxes amounted to  16 percent of firm income, quasitaxes were larger by
50 percent.  Losses on money were nearly four times larger than formal taxes.  Formal subsidies
amounted to only 0.4 percent of firm income, but quasisubsidies  were 7.4 percent of income.  Gains
on money were 60.5 percent of income.  Vodopivec also demonstratee  that net subsidies (the
difference between the sum of subsides and the sum of taxes) per worker were inversely and
progressively related to income per worker.  That is, both taxes and subsidies were applied
selectively, with only profitable firms being taxed, and only unprofitable firms being subsidized.
The Yugoslav objective to stabilize employment and wages was typical of socialist economies
in general-  Kornai (1980, p. 315) state that socialist governments  tried to achieve "stabilization  of
every firm, and even of every job."  Research on other socialist countries shows similar income-
leveling  effects of interfirm redistribution, achieved through similar means.'
Reforms During the Transition
The 1988 Enterprise Law transferred decision-making  right from workers to equity owners,
2  Vodopivec  (1994) defines quasitaxes as appropriations  of resources  by one agent  that were  formally
accounted  for as financial  investments  by another  agent. The resources  appeared  on the asset  side of the investor's
balance  sheet, but were typically  written off after several years (clearly, such investinents  were mandatory). Losses
on money are defined as inflation tax on money assets held for transaction purposes.
3 See Kormai  and Matits(1987)  for evidence on Hungary, and Schaffer(1990)  for evidence on Poland).
3thus formally ending  the era of self-management.) The right of employers to lay off workers is
perhlaps  the niost radical break with the past.  The layoff policy was implemented  in Iwo steps.  First.
the Yugoslav Labor Code of Octoher 1989  gave employers Ihe righlt  to lay off workers, but at
considerable cost.  Then in February 1991. the layol' costs borne by the lirm were reduced, most
notably hv reducing the mandated advance noitification  period from 24 months to 6 months.
Since  1991,  workers  identified as rediundant were given the following  entitlements.  They
could take reassignment within a firm, including to a job that requires fewer skills; they could be
retrained; they could take early retirement with the firm purchasing their missing pension credits; or
the employer could be required to keep them for at least six months and pay them at least the
minimum  wage.'  Firms bear the costs of these entitlements, but -- conditional on the submission of a
restructuring plan -- the firms can he reimbursed hy the government for 50 percent of the associated
costs.'
Decisions about the restructuring program. including decisions about redundant workers, rest
with the worker council (in social enterprises) or with the manager (in private enterprises).  Criteria
for identifying  redundant workers are spelled out in the general collective bargaining agreement of
August 1990. They are (in order of priority): work quality (productivity), qualifications, work
experience. seniority, health, and social factors (number of dependents, whether it might be possible
for the individual to work on a farm or become self-employed. and whether the individual is an
owner  or part-owner  of a mixed  o  r private  firm).
4  With  implementation  of privatization being  unduly  delayed  (after  a two-year  impasse  in tde parliament,
the  privatization  bill  was finally  passed  in November  1992),  corporate  governance  has  yet to undergo  a real  change.
See Pleskovic and Sachs (1994) for a discussioni  of privarization legislation.
5  This last option has been dubbed "paid vacation," because  redundant  workers have typically not worked.
6  For example, in 1990  the Slovenian  government  cofirnanced  21,223 redundant  workers.  Of these, 172
were trained and placed in another fimi; 1.082 chose early retirement; 2,499 received a lump-sum payment; and
17,470 were on  "paid vacation."
4l xcept lor workers wIloL  quit or are dismissedt  l'r  disciplinary reasons. workers with at least
nine months of continuous employment  can qlualify  for unemployment  compensation. The
replacement  rate  is 70 percent, dropping to 60 percenit  afler lhe first thrce months.  Tlhe  duration ol'
individuals' eligibility to coBllect  uncmploiyment  compensation  decends on lhe  iduration  of their
previous emplolymiient.  The duration  oil blenfclits  is tied it' previous  work experience with a minimum
duration ol'  three months.  At the upper  limit, workers with cumulative employment  record ol' 20 or
more years are ciiiitled  tlo  a maximum of two years.  Bel;'rc the  February 1991 law change, workers
laid off because of bankruptcy were entitled to twice the maximum duration as otherwise comparable
workers.  After their right to unemployment  compensation  expires, unemployed  workers are eligible
for means-tested  unemployment assistance.
Before March 1992, men qualified  for old-age pension at 60 years of age and 40 years of
work experience, and women at 55 years of age and 35 years of work experience.  The level of
pension was 85 percent of the pension base, computed as the average of the inflation-adjusted  wages
in ten best years.  Early retirement at reduced pension levels was available to men at 55 years of age
and 35 years of wo;  ic  experience (50 years of age and 30 years of work experience for women).  The
1992 law called for pensionahle ages to increase gradually to 63 for men and 58 for women.  It also
stiffens the conditions for early retirement.
To alleviate the consequences of the collapse of trade within the other republics of former
Yugoslavia, the government in July 1991 suspended  the initiation of bankruptcy  proceedings and
introduced a program that subsidized employment in financially distressed firms.  Firms that qualified
for bankruptcy wete relieved of tax obligations  and of liability for electricity bills.  For 1991, total
employment subsidies amounted to 12.1 billion tolars (5.6 billion in unpaid taxes, 3.8 billion for
unpaid electricity, and 2.8 billion in direct subsidies). or ahout 3.5 percent of GDP (Vodopivec  and
Hribar-Milic, 1993). Total subsidies represented 47 percent of expenses for labor market programs in
51991. coimp.ared  with 14 percent spetit  on direct job creation.
The Yugoslav labor code of October 1989, improved by the Slovenian amendments  of
February 1991,  removes adininistrauive  constraints on the wage bill. as well as collective
decisionmaking about the wage scale.  The most important new feature regarding wage setting is that
managers are authorized to determine wages.  Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) showed that wage
inequality within and across firms rose dramatically when managerial wage setting was implemented.
As in other formerly socialist countries. thte  tiansition has resulted iri  sharp declines in output
and employment. After a period of steady growth in the 1970s  and stagnation during the 19pOs,
Slovenian GDP fell 18.6 percent during 1989-92. Reflecting  the fall in production and reforms of the
labor market, the unemployment  rate soared from 4 percent in 1989 to over 14 percent in 1994.  As
shown in Table 1, Slovenia's macroeconomic  performance  during the transition has been similar to
that of other transitional economies.
2.  DISPLACEMENT TRENDS IN SLOVENIA
Perhaps the most visible and painful consequence of transition has been the escalation of
unemployment. After years of virtually certain employment, workers were confronted with the
prospect of displacement.  As shown at the bottom of Table 2, employment plummeted and labor
turnover rose dramatically.  Institutional changes described above, coupled by disruptions in trade
both with other Eastern European countries and particularly with other republics of former
Yugoslavia, produced an accelerating trend of displacement starting in 1989.
To quantify these trends, a worker at least twenty years old who lost a job either through
layoff or plant closing followed by a spell of unemployment  was defined as displaced.  This definition
was partially prompted by available data, but still corresponds roughly to definitions used in the U.S.
Survey of Displaced Workers (SDW).  The main differences in the displacement  definition between
6Slovenia and the U.S. are that in Slovenia, the displaced are not rc  uired to have had three years ol
prior job experience, and there is no requirement that the displaced have a period of unemployment  in
the U.S.  Effective differences in these definitions are not large.  The vast majority ol displaced
workers in Slovenia were coming from a system of virtually certain employment and therefire m(st
would meet the three year experience requirement.  On the other hand, the vast majority of U.S.
displaced workers do suffer some period of unemployment. Therefore, the U.S and Canadian
displacement information can serve to place the Slovenian experience in perspective.
Since 1991, 3-4 percent of Slovenian workers employed at the beginning of the year became
displaced.  As shown at the top of Table 2, bankruptcies were responsible for all displacements
initially.  After the 1991 policy shift which suspended bankruptcies but allowed layoffs, layoffs
became the dominant source of displacement.  Under transition, displacements have represented about
30 percent of all exits from employment and 14-22 percent of inflows into unemployment.
The North American recession of the early 1980's was the steepest economic decline since
World War I.  Table 3 shows that displacement experienced during the Slovenian economic  transition
was even greater than in the U.S. and Canada.  More than I I percent of the Slovenian workforce
became displaced during the four-year period,  five percentage points greater than in the U.S. and one
percentage point greater than in Canada.  Bankruptcies accounted for just over half of all
displacements in the U.S. and Slovenia, but were less important in Canada.
The demographic characteristics of displaced workers in Slovenia do not differ greatly from
those in North America.  Slovenian displaced workers were more likely to be female, reflecting the
higher female labor force participation rates in Slovenia.  Relative to North America, Slovenian
displaced workers were younger, and more heavily concentrated in construction and blue-collar
sectors.  The incidence of displacement in Slovenian manufacturing  sector was nearly identical to that
in the recessed U.S manufacturing sector.
7To further explore the incidence and wage loss of displacement, the next section sketches a
simple model of turnover.  The empirical work tests whether the theoretical  expectations arc borne
out by the data.
3.  A THEORY OF LABOR TUR1%JVER
Turnover in the social sector can be initiated by workers or the firm.  Firms may opt to layoff
unprofitable  workers or workers may opt to exit to more attractive options inside or outside the labor
force.  Let H be the stock of genera! training embodied in a worker.  The worker also has  irm
specific human capital equal to h.  The output of the worker in the firm is
qp  =  y.-  + h  (1)
where y. is the output per unit of general training in the firm and output per unit of specific human
capital is normalized to one.
The worker's earnings in the firm are given by
5VF  = alH  + 1Th  (2)
where cp is the return per unit of huma, capital in the firm and ,  is the workers share of returns to
specific human capital.  In market economies with flexible wages and mobile labor, one would expect
that cp  yF  so that workers capture all returns to general training.  This may not be true in
transitional economies if labor is not free to seek its highest return or if wages are not flexible.
The worker's stream of returns from staying with the firm will be given by (2) if employment
is certain.  With transition, however, layoffs or banlrruptcies  became possible.  Therefore, the returns
to remaining with the firm must reflect the possibility of displacement. The probability of layoff is
bF. The stream of returns for a worker eisiployed in the firm is
rV  =  WF + bI(VU - VW)
=  aF.H + j6h + bF(VU  - VZ)
8whcrc r is the discount ratc and Vu is the cxpected dlkcounicd lilftimc e&nings  for an unemploycd
worker.  If b 1, - 0, then tle worker has ccrtain employment  with the firm at WI,  per perioxd. We
assumc that WI, >  rV, so that the firm must pay cnough  to insurc that ccrtain cinploymcnt pays lcter
than unemployment, 7 otherwisc the worker has no incentive to work.  This restriction also implies
that V F >  Vu so that the second term in (3) is negative.
The worker has opportunities elsewhere given by
arVo  =  aWo  0 ab0(Vu  - Vw)  (4)
Y=xO  aDH  (5)
where ci is the return per unit of human capital elsewhere, a is the probability of getting a job
elsewhere,  bo is the probability of job loss, and rVO is the stream of return from other jobs.  Specific
human capital is assumed to have no value in other firms.  General training is allowed to have
different returns elsewhere than in the current firm.  In a freely mobile labor market, aO =  a,,.
Displacement
A firm's profit from maintaining the employment  relation is the difference between the value
of worker output, qp.,  and the wage Wp.  However, firms may keep workers when qp < Wp if the
firm faces one-time firing costs, F.  The firm may also qualify for one-time layoff subsidies, S.  As
described above, firms in Slovenia faced significant firing costs associated with mandated  training,
pensioning or compensation of displaced workers, but some firms had these costs cofinanced by the
central govermment.
The firm's stream of net returns on the worker is given by
rVF =  qF  WF  + r(F-S)  (6)
=(F  - raF)  H  + (I - )h  + r(F -S)  <  0  if  layoff
2  0  otherwise
7  This is similar to the argumem advanced by Sbapim and Stiglitz (1984).
9Thei  subsidy raises the probability of layoff while firing costs and specific human capital lower the
probability of layoff.  General training would have no effect on layoffs liy  'y  = ae so that workers get
all returns 1roim  general training.  In (6), the effect of general training on layoffs depends on the
relative sizes of -y,.  and ax, 1 . If salaries for highly educated workers were artificially constrained and
those of less-educated  workers artificially raised under socialism,  as argued by Orazem and
Vodopivec (1995), then  YFp>  ra for the most educated and  'fpCaF for the least-educated  at the start
of transition.  This would suggest that the probability of layoffs would decrease with the education
level of the worker.
Ouits
Rearranging (3) and (4) and taking the difference yields the expected return from quitting,
Q=aV(  - V F
=  a rbV  - [aFHr+  h+bVu 1 >  0  if quit ( r+b 0 r +br
<  0  otherwise
The probability of quitting falls as h increases.  The probability of being displaced, b1, raises the
return from quitting, while increases in the probability of displacement in other firms, b,  reduce the
return to quitting.'  Since the probability of displacement is determined by (6), theory suggests  that
factors which increase the probability of displacement in (6) should also raise the propensity to quit.
General training has an ambiguous effect on quits.  Unlike layoffs, however, the effect of H
on quits will not be neutral even if aCF  =  a. 0 as long as a  g  1 and bo #  bp.  The expected return to
unemployment also has an ambiguous  effect on quits.  The sign depends upon the relative magnitudes
of the layoff probabilities in the firm and elsewhere.  Workers may have an incentive to quit firms
with low layoff probabilities to enter firms with high layoff probabilities if the returns to
8 aQ/ObF  =  -vu  +  W,/r  +  bF >  0 under the  assmption that  returns  to certan employeMt, WF,  exceed
returns to unemployment, rVu.  OQ/ab 0 =  (a(rV7U-  W0))I(r +  b0)  <  0 under a silar  assumption  applied to
alternative  employment.
10unemployment  are sufficiently high.
The probability of quitting decreases as WI,  increases.  However, the effect of wages
elsewhere on the quit probability depends upon the accession rate and the relative sizes of the layoff
probabilities in the firm and elsewhere.  Higher opportunity wages, W,. are more likely to induce
quits when the job accession rate, a, is large and when b,, is small.
To close the model, one can specify the stream of returns from unemployment by
rVu = B + a(V"  - Vu)
where B is the unemployment benefit per period.  Substituting for Vo and rearranging yields
V=  (r+b0)1  + aWe  (8)
u  (r+bJ)(r  +  a)
which may be inserted into (7) to derive the reduced form quit condition.  However, no further
unambiguous  predictions result.
4.  DATA SOURCES
The implications of the theoretical model were tested using several data sets oin  Slovenian
workers and enterprises, constructed from registered unemployment  records, workers' earnings
records and personal work histories, and accounting data on enterprises.
Data on displaced workers were obtained from the official registry of unemployed.  The files
include demographic characteristics, date and cause of employment  termination, starting and ending
date of the unemployment spell, whether the spell ended in employment  or labor force exit, and
support received during the unemployment spell.
For the analysis of labor turnover, we merged unemployment  and work history data sets.  The
IIlatter covers post-1986 spells of employment, unemployment, out of labor force for a five percent
random sample of Slovenian workers (a description of the data set is given in Abraham and
Vodopivec, 1993). To include both bankruptcies and layoffs as sources of displacement, we focused
on exits from employment during June 30. 1991 and June 30, 1992.  Possible  transitions from
employment were firm-initiated displacement; quits to alternate employment; or quits t')
unemployment  or exit from the labor force.  The alternative, "stayers", are those who remain with
the same firm until June 30,  1992.  Firm-initiated  displacements were those who lost jobs due to
layoff or bankruptcy.  Quits which resulted in reemployment within 30 days were viewed as moving
to alternate employment.  Other quits were to extended unemployment  or exits from the labor force.
When there were multiple transitions within the year, only the first was included.
There are reasons to believe that the unemployment  register data. is of high quality.  Those
with as little as nine-months of continuous employment  were eligible for unemployment  compensation
as well as a range of other benefits, so most of those displaced from steady employment  had an
incentive to register.'  Information on transition out of unemployment is also reliable.  An
unemployed worker who succeeds in finding a new job must retrieve his "work booklet" from the
employrient office and bring it to his new employer, triggerin- a record for exit to a job.
There are differences between registered unemployed and unemployment  as formally defined
by the International Labor Organization (ILO).  A comparison with the Slovenian labor force survey
shows that only a subset of registered unemployed is counted as unemployed by the survey, and vice
versa.  Between 1989 and 1991, about 80 percent of those found unemployed  by the survey were
registered as unemployed at an employment office. Most of the unregistered unemployed were school-
9These  benefits  included  training,  access  to night  classes.  cofinancing  of internships,  employment  subsidies,
child care subsidies.  priority in queues for renting  or buying apartments,  eligibility  for child allowances  and
voluntary  old-age  insurance,  and even  a lower  likelihood  that  a spouse  will  be laid off (redundancy  decisions  took
into account  whether  or not there were other  unemployed  in the household).
12leavers or short-term employees who would not qualify for unemployment  compensation. On the
other hand, the survey also shows that not all registered unemployed are unemployed as measured by
the ILO standards.  According to the survey, in 1990, 42 percent of registered unemployed were
performing paid work at least one hour in the reference week, although until 1994, legislation allowed
such irregular work without any reduction in unemployment  compensation. There is also the
possibility of employment in the gray economy (informal employment which avoids payment of taxes)
while receiving unemployment benefits.  For the present analysis of labor turnover and
postdisplacement  wage growth, it is important to emphasize that the unemployed will include also
those with irregular or gray economy earnings.
Information on pre- and post-displacement  jobs and earnings were obtained from the
Slovenian Pension and Invalid Fund.  The Fund collects data on hours and earnings for all workers
who are paying contributions to the Fund.  Similar to other transitional economies, old-age insurance
is mandatory so virmally all workers are covered.  This data was merged with the employment
history files which contained information on education, job tenure and work experience, and other
personal characteristics.  These two sources were also available for a reference group of continuously
employed workers.  Hourly wages were computed as earnings divided by hours.  Given that wages
are computed over the employment spell, monthly dummy variables are used to construct 'deflated'
hourly wage, purged of the effects of changes in consumer prices over the spell.  Details on data
collection procedures and processing of data are reported in Orazem and Vodopivec (1995).
The theory required information on firm layoff subsidies and firm returns to the employment
relationship.  Accounting data for all incorporated firms in the "economic  sphere" (all sectors of the
economy excfTt beslth, education, and government) provided profit and loss statements, firm
employment, and firm receipt of restructuring subsidies. These firm level data were merged into the
individual data using common firm identifiers.
13'l  iis data set compares favorably  to data used to study displacement in the U.S.  It combines
[he advantages of detailed individual information, a strength of the U.S. Displaced Workers Survey
(l)WS)."' and (lie accuracy of official earnings records, a strength of recent studies based on
quarterly U.S.  Unemployment  Insurance (UI) payment records."  At the same time, this data set
avoiids  the recall bias of' the DWS and the limited individual information  of the Ul records.  To our
knowledge. the Slovenia unemployment  data is also uniquely able to measure firm profits, differential
layoli costs, and the proximate cause of unemployment.
5.  EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS
Transitions out of employment
The theory generated several predictions regarding transitions out of employment. First, job
tenure, a proxy for firm-specific human capital, is expected to lower the probability of both
displacements and quits.  Displacement  subsidies raise the probability  of layoff, as would low firm
returns on the employment relationship.  Similarly, subsidies and low firm returns would raise quit
propensities through higher b, . General human capital, as measured by labor market experience and
education, has ambiguous  effects on turnover although past overpayment of the least-skilled  and
underpayment of the most-skilled would suggest an inverse relationship between layoffs and skill.
Other control variables included in the analysis include ethnicity, gender, appointnent type, firm size,
firm ownership type and industry.
The analysis uses a multinomial  logit specification. Table 4 contains the predicted probability
of transition associated with each regressor.  The outcomes are broadly consistent with the theory.
Most impressively, all 13 variables with significant coefficients in the displacement equation had the
10  Papers which use the DWS include Seitchik and Zornitsky (1989), and Swaim and Podgursky (1987).
See, for example. Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan  (1993a,b).
14same sign in at least one ol the two quit equations, consistent with the predicted elfect of h,.  on quits.
As years of job tenure increase, probability of all transitions ten(ds  to decline.  T'he only
exception  of note is the higher probability of exiting the labor lorce for those with 20+  years of joh
tenure, a pattern that is replicated in the effects of overall experietnce  on labor force exits' 2
Displacement  subsidies increased both firm- and worker-initiated  transitions.  Displlacemenlt
was 51 percent more likely for workers in subsidized firms than for comparable  workers in firms not
receiving the subsidies.  The presence of subsidies also induced quits by increasing the probability ol
displacement in the firm.  Workers in firms receiving the subsidies were 43 percent more likely to
switch firms and 21 percent more likely to exit the labor force.
Firms with low values of yF  relative to a,, are presumably those in the lowest profitability
quartile.  Workers in these low profit firms were nearly twice as likely to be displaced as comparable
workers in normal profit firms.  In contrast, workers in top quartile profit firms are 41 percent less
likely to be displaced.  Workers in low profit firms are 51 percent more likely to switch firms, but
firm profits do not significantly affect labor force exits.
There is some evidence that the probability of displacement is inversely related to general
skills.  While the sign patterns are strongly consistent with priors, most coefficients are insignificant.
Propensity to quit to alternate employment is positively related to education level while propensity to
exit the labor force is inversely related to educatio-n  level  - Job experience has no systematic effect on
propensity to change firms, but it lowers propensity to exit the labor force until retirement age.
One might think that transition would be accompanied by an increase in discriminatory
treatment of women and ethnic minorities. However, women were not significantly  more likely to be
12 This is certainly  due to retirements  by high  tenure/experienced  workers. Orazem  and Vodopivec  (1995)
argued  that this  movement  of experienced  workers  out of the labor  fbrce  corresponded  to increases  in the  value  of
pensions  relative  to wages. Unlike  wages,  pensions  were  fully  indexed  to inflation.  Thus,  pensions  maintained  their
real value during  transition.  while  real wages  fell on avenge of 35 percent.
15displaced or to quit, nor were non-Slovenes significantly more likely to be displaced.  Non-Slovenians
(most of them being Croats, Muslims, and Serbs) were apparently less likely to switch jobs, and
much more likely to withdraw from the labor force.  Persons in the "nationality missing" category--
whose parameters strongly resemble the ones of non-Slovenians-were those not included in the March
1991 census.  Most of these are probably non-Slovenians.
Small turnover effects are associated with private ownership and foreign ownership.  Larger
differences in turnover exist across industries. Turnover differences also exist between different sized
firms.  Workers in the smallest firms have higher probability of layoff or job switch but a lower
probability of exiting the labor force.
Cost of Impending Displacement
A recent topic of considerable research in the U.S. has been to measure the cost of worker
displacement.  Papers by Hamermesh (1987); Topel (1991); and Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan
(1993a,b) used the samples of displaced workers to measure lost earnings from job loss.  The value of
using displaced workers, defined as workers who lost jobs from mass layoffs or plant closings, as
opposed to all job losers, is that mass layoffs are less likely to be due to unobserved individual
worker productivity.  Consequently, wage changes for displaced workers will more accurately reflect
the costs of exogenous  job loss whereas other job losses may reflect revealed low worker
productivity.
Hanr.:rmesh  found no evidence of slower wage growth for displaced workers in the years
before displacement.  However, Jacobson et al found large and significant  wage losses for displaced
workers in the three years before the displacement occurred.  They argued that the predisplacement
wage loss was part of the same process that led to displacement and furither  post- displacement wage
loss.  Before displacement, troubled firms attempted to avoid layoffs by holding back on wage
increases or instituting wage cuts.
16The empirical model of labor transitions showed that workers respond to the prospect of
displacement by switching jobs or by withdrawing from the labor force.  Displacement might also be
prevented by acccpting wage cuts, as found by Jacobson et al.  To investigate that question, we
estimated a log wage equation.  In addition to standard demographic  characteristics, human capital
variables and industry controls, the regressors included a dummy variable which took the value of one
if the person was displaced later in the year.  The displacement dummy was interacted with the other
variables to test whether differences in returns to human capital and demographic attributes existed
before displacement occurred.
We find that workers who experienced displacement later in 1990 were indeed paid less that
otherwise identical workers.  The wage loss amounted to 12 percent for a Slovenian male in
manufacturing holding a vocational degree with three to five years of experience.  The wage loss
varies across skill groups, with the largest percentage wage losses for university educated workers and
for those with at least 10 years of job experience.
Other things equal, equation (7) predicts that below normal returns to general training should
induce quits to enter alternative employment. The pattern holds for education groups in Table 4-the
education groups losing the least in Table 5 are the least likely to switch firms, those losing the most
in Table 5 are the most likely to switch firms.  The quit relationship for experience is less clear cut.
The pre-displacement wage loss was three percent smaller for women than for men.  There
were no significant differences in predisplacement  wage loss across ethnic groups.
Workers employed in services and finance and real estate had the largest predisplacement  wage
losses.  Workers in construction actually received wage gains before being displaced.  With pending
privatization, wages could have been raised artificially, forcing the enterprise into bankruptcy and
enabling subsequent acquisition of firm shares by its workers.  Predisplacement  wage losses also
varied across regions.  Wage losses before displacement were largest in the most agricultural regions
17oii Slovellia.
PIstdisiiclacement  l  oml  lyment  and Wages
'a1blc 6 conltains stylized  l:acts  about the workers  in Slovenia who were  displaced.  For
purpose of comparison, statistics on U.S. and Canadian dis,,laced workers are included.  Roughly
one-third ol displaced Sloveniain  workers found reemployment  within the period, half the
reemployment  rale in the U.S. anid  Canada.  Slovenian men are marginally more successful than
women in tinding  new employment.  Nevertheless, half were still unemployed at the end of the
period.,  more than double  the proportion unemployed in the other countries.  Both suppiy- and
demanid-side  explanations potentially explain the relatively slow exit rate from unemployment in
Slovenia.  On the demand-side, slow job creation during transition left few opportunities for the
displaced, particularly in social sector jobs.  On the supply-side, unemployment  compensation
durations of up to two years (four years before 1991) may have limited incentives  to accept jobs.
There was also a possibility of supplementing  unemployment income with part-time informal sector or
hmnie  production  jobs while remaining officially unemployed, further raising reservation wages for
formal sector jobs relative to formal sector wages.
Displaced Slovenian workers who found new jobs generally received real wage gains.  Over
68 percent of Slovenia workers who found employment received postdisplacement  wages above their
previous wage.  Only 31 percent took pay cuts, in contrast to 44 percent in the U.S. and 56 percent
in Canada.  Clearly. those displaced Slovenian workers who found reemployment were unique, so the
wage results are subject to)  considerable selection bias.  In particular, if opportunity costs for
accepting formal sector employment were high, only those with unusually good market opportunities
would he induced to accept new employment.
Another complication faced by displaced workers seeking  employment is the likelihood  of
changing occupation or industry.  As shown in table 7, only about half of the reemployed  workers
18found employment in the same occupation. The group least likely to change oceupations is t(e
unskilled with 72 percent staying in the same occupation. The employment indexes show that the
occupational mix is not stationary--the number of displaced workers finding jobs as managers was
more than twice the number of displaced managers.  On the other hand, the number of displaced
finding jobs in the professional, administrative  support and semi-skilled  occupations is smaller than
the number of displaced from those occupations. Occupations show signs of both downward and
upward mobility.  A large proportion (43 percent) of the successful semi-skilled  job seekers found
reemployment as unskilled workers.  In contrast, 17 percent of successful professional  job seekers and
7 percent of reemployed administrative support workers became managers.
Industry reemployment paths reinforce the conclusion that displaced must vigorously adjust to
find a job.  About one-third of the reemployed  workers changed broad industry of employment. The
most mobile were those in trade, government and transportation, while reemployed construction
workers largely remained in the construction sector.  Construction, manufacturing, and government
lost more workers than they reemployed while trade and financial services hired more displaced than
they displaced.
Probability of Reemployment and Wage Loss
The surprising finding from Table 6 that average wages for reemployed  displaced workers
rose is conditional on reemployment status and holds no other individual attributes fixed.  To generate
comparative static estimates of wage changes from displacement, designate the difference in log wages
between 1991 and 1990 as AInW.  Define X as a vector of human capital attributes and personal
characteristics, R2 is a dummy variable indicating  whether the worker is reemployed in the same two-
digit industry and R4 is a dummy variable equal to one when the worker is reemployed in the same
four-digit industry.  In addition, let AInWR  be the log change in the reference wage, defined as the
unconditional change in log mean wages for continuously employed workers in the same
19cducation/industry/experience  cell.
We estimate
(AMnW - &lnW,)  = Xo  +  R2-y  +  R46  +  (9)
where the parameters are interpretable as the effect of the regressor on wage growth for displaced
workers relative to those who were not displaced.  Ignoring wage changes in the reference group by
replacing the dependent variable in (9) with AInW will generate parameters interpretable  as the effect
of the regressors on wage growth relative to other displaced workers.  The estimates of equation (9)
will be conditional on observing pre- and post-displacement  earnings.  Therefore, we select out all
displaced workers who fail to find a job by the end of 1991.  Reemployment is undoubtedly
correlated with the observed attributes, X, as well as variables linked to incentives  to search for or
accept reemployment.
Let I be an index which represents the value of accepting reemployment following
displacement.  I is assumed to be a function of the human capital variables in (9), factors which
reflect nonmarket productivity, Z, and beliefs concerning the distribution of wages, W." 3 The index
finction is of the form
I=  X@, +  Z02 +  W3  +10)
so that E  =  1 if I >  0 and E  = 0 otherwise, where E represents employment.  Assuming  t  and f  are
distributed bivariate normal, a correction for the presumed nonzero conditional mean in (9) is to
estimate
13 This reduced-form  specification  is  justified  by comparing  the value  of being  unemployed,  V,  't  th
value of accepting  employment  V0  Vu  acts  as a worker's  reservation  wage. The worker  accepts  a job only if
>  V..  Elements  of Z act in the role of unemployment  benefits,  B, in (8).  Elements  of W act in dte role  of the
worker's beliefs  about  the accession  rate, a, layoff  possibility,  b, and expected  wages,  W 0 in (8). The selection
process  is identified  because  B and W do not direcdy  affect  an individual  firm's wage  offer but they  do affect  the
worker's beliefs about V,.
20(AInW - AlnW)  = Xfl  +  R2-Y  + R46 + XX -F(0I-) +  (11)
where JA  is a random error with zero mean, f is the normal density function and F is the normal
cumulative distribution function.
Unfortunately, the subset of the displaced who became reemployed in the employment  history
data set is too small to yield reliable estimates of equation (10).  Therefore, equation (10) was
estimated using data from the universe of displaced workers among the registered unemployed, for
those workers for which we observe their predisplacement  wage."  There were 5,462 such displaced
workers in 1990, and for 904 we observed their postdisplacement  wage by the end of 1991.'5 The
disadvantage  of the registered unemployed data set is that there is no information on firm
characteristics  and worker tenure.  Nevertheless, the data allow sufficient instruments to identify the
probability of exit from unemployment.
Elements of Z include presence of dependents, per capita farm land in the locality, and the
level of unemployment benefits which are tied to the level of the previous wage."  Dependents
would raise the formal sector reservation wage by raising home productivity.  Areas with more farm
land would have more opportunities for irregular, gray economy or home production, also increasing
the reservation wage.  Elements of W include the predisplacement  local unemployment  rate and a
Herfindahl index for industrial mix in the locality.  Higher local unemployment rates serve as an
14  Our  data set on eamings  included  information  on predisplacement  earnings  for 54 percent  of workers
displaced  in 1990. Various  reasons  that  contributed  to incomplete  merging  of work  history  and unemployment  data
with  earnings  records are discussed  in Orazem  and Vodopivec  (1995). There are no reasons  to believe  that
omissions  are nonrandom.
15  Of workers  displaced  in 1990,  34.3 percent  found  a job within  a year from  displacement.  Somewhat
lower  reemployment  rate implied  by the above  numbers  results  from  previously  mentioned  omissions  in our data
set on earnings.
16  Tbe unemployment  benefit  was  set at 70 percent  of the predisplacement  wage.
21index of the magnitude of the adverse labor demand shock in the locality.  Higher Herfindahl indexes
imply fewer choices ol industries in which to search in the loc-1 labor market.  Table 7 showed that
about half of tlhe  displaced workers who successfully  found jobs switched industries.  Those displaced
in a local labor market with only one employer would not have alternate sectors in which to search.
Higher unemployment rates and Herfindahl indexes are expected to increase the search effort required
to find a job.
Table 8 reports the Probit equation for the probability of becoming reemployed.  While the
primary purpose of this estimate is to generate the selection correction for equation (I1), the estimates
have interest in their own right.  What is particularly interesting is the performance of the local labor
market and household production instruments. The unemployment  rate of the locality at the time of
displacement, per capita farm land, and Herfindahl index of industry concentration significantly affect
the probability of becoming reemployed in the way predicted above.  The presence of dependents also
has the predicted sign but is iiisignificant. Those with higher predisplacement  wages are more likely
to exit unemployment,  perhaps because the opportunity cost of remaining  unemployed exceeds the
value of higher unemployment benefits.  Workers with elementary and vocational education are less
likely to reemploy within a year, as are those with the most prior work experience.
The estimation of variants of equations (9) and (11) are reported in Table 9.  Note first that
the selectivity correction variable, X, is highly significant.  Since its exclusion biases the results, we
concentrate on the results that correct for selectivity.  They show that reemployment wage growth
vary across workers with different demographic  and human capital characteristics.  Greater experience
is found to significantly reduce wage growth.  The effect becomes statistically  signif  mant  for those
with 10 or more years of experience, whose wage growth is reduced by I1 percent.  The wage loss
for those with 25 to 30 years of experience is 36 percent.  A plausible explanation is that experience -
- instead of tenure, for which we do not have information  - captures the loss of specific human
22capital 1rom displacement. The magnitude of tile wage loss  for experienced workers is comparable to
that found  by studies  ol displacement in market cconomies."7
The resulLs  reveal no systematic relationship  hetween the wage growth and education.  Both
the least and the most educated  experienced larger wage groiwth,  hut the diffcrcnces from otlher
education groups were insignificant.  As an investment in general human skills, education did not
appear to lose value from displacement.
Women's postdisplacement wage growth was larger than men's  by 7 percent.  Eviutcice from
other studies is mixed.  For example. Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) reported that men's
short-term reemployment losses were larger than women's; Podgurski and Swaim (1987) found the
opposite.  We also find that the wage  growth of displaced Non-Slovenians  exceeded that of Slovenes
by 12.5 percent.  In the light of growing ethnic tensions in the 1990s. this is a surprising result.
Abraham and Vodopivec (1993) found significantly  smaller transition rates from unemployment  to
employment for non-Slovenians in 1989 and 1991, but Orazem and Vodopivec  (1995) found no
evidence of wage discrimination against Non-Slovenians  either before or after transition began.
The results also show that reemployment in the same broad,  two-digit industry is associated
with faster wage growth, but remaining in the same four-digit (as well as the same two-digit) industry
eliminates the gain.  Evidence summarized in Hamermesh (1989) suggests that workers who change
industries suffer greater wage losses.
The effect of selection on estimated wage growth is most dramatically demonstrated by the
difference in the intercept terms in columns one and two of Table 9.  The  constant term changes from
a positive value in the uncorrected equation to negative in the selectivity corrected equation.  Siace
17  Topel  (1991)  placed the cost of displacement  for workers  with 20 years  of tenure  at 40 percent  wage
loss.  Jacobson.  Lalonde  and Sullivan  (1993)  found  wage losses  averaging  25 percent  across  experience  groups.
Hamermesh's  (1987)  estimates  show average  wage losses  of 28 percent  for displaced  workers  with 11-20  years  of
seniority.
23the constant term measures the average wage change for the baseline individual, it is clear that the
earlier reported positive average wage gains by displaced workers is an outcome of the selection
process.  In the latter equation, the constant term and the selectivity correction evaluated at the sample
mean cancel out, indicating zero wage growth for a baseline person (a Slovenian male with vocational
education and three to five years of experience), adjusted for the reference wage growth as defined
above.
Sharp differences in estimates produced by selection correction procedure and the significance
of the selectivity correction variable indicate that selection  plays a major role in determining wage
growth of displaced workers.  We find that positive selection occurs -- that the same unobserved
factors which help the displaced find jobs also contribute to their higher wage growth.'"  The
implication  is that for workers not (yet) reemployed and thus excluded in the wage growth equation,
we can expect wage growth below that which we find for our sample of reemploye' workers.
Indeed, since the mean value for X for those excluded in equation (I 1) is lower that for those who
reemployed, our estimates imply that, upon reemployment, a baseline persoi. '.  ri the excluded group
would suffer wage losses compared with predisplacement  wages.
6.  CONCLUSION
Transition of former socialist economies produced a phenomenon previously unknown  to these
economies- displacement.  Unusually rich administrative  data sets covering both workers and firms
enabled us to study this phenomenon for Slovenia, during 1987-1993. We described displacement
*'  Swaim and Podgurskd  (1987) show in the context of a job search model that positive selection can be
interpreted as reemployed workers receiving higher wage offers than those who do not reemploy.
24trends as well as characteristic,s  of workers displaced, and compared them to tho:e in market
economies during a major recession.  We also analyzed determinants of displacement in a broader
framework of labor turnover, as well as explored factors associated with postdisplacement  wage
losses. The major findings of the study are the following.
*  Displacement in Slovenia during 1990-1993, amounting to 3 to 4 percent of labor force per
year, exceeded displacement during the recession of the early eighties in North America.
There are striking similarities between the two in the incidence  of displacement regarding age,
gender, industry of displacement, as well as reemployment paths.
*  Workers try to avoid displacement  by both switching to another job and exiting the labor
force.  We also find that, before becoming displaced, workers take a cut in their wages.
*  Probability of displacement is negatively correlated with tenure, as is the probability of job
quits.  We also find that in the year before becoming displaced, displaced workers had lower
wages than otherwise comparable workers who did not lose their jobs.
*  Women are no more likely to be displaced than men.  Non-Slovenians  are not more likely to
be displaced than Slovenians. Women face smaller post-displacement  wage losses than men,
and non-Slovenians  face equal wage losses.
*  Firm characteristics matter.  The smaller and the less profitable the firm, the larger the
likelihood of displacement as well as of job-switching.  Restructuring subsidies which lowered
firm layoff costs increase both firm- and worker-initiated transitions.
*  About half of the displaced workers who find new jobs change occupations, and about one
third change broadly defined industry of employment.
*  Only about one third of workers displaced during 1990 found a job by the end of 1991.
Surprisingly, for over 68 percent of them, wage growth exceeded the median wage growth in
the economy.  The median gain was 17 percent.  The group which did not reemploy seems to
25he paying a much larger toll: not only are the workers staying unemployed much longer, but
they face much lower reemployment wages.  It is possible that they did not reemploy because
their reservation wage is raised relative to available market opportunities by both
unemployment compensation and pay from irregular or gray economy employment.  If that is
the case, their unemployment income may dominate their market income prospects.
*  Similar to studies of displacement in the U.S., we find that greater job experience is
associated with larger postdisplacement  wage losses. The magnitude of these losses is
consistent with findings of wage losses in the U.S.
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